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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has discretionary appellate jurisdiction by writ of 
certiorari on decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) 
& (5) (Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The sole issue is whether the court of appeals correctly interpreted the term 
"compensation" under Section 34A-3-110 of the Utah Code to not include payments 
medical expenses subject to apportionment under that provision. 
The standard of review for the court of appeals' interpretation/application of a 
statute is correction-of-error. Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12, f^ 9, 
84 P.3d 1201, 1205. 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
1. "As used in this chapter: . . . (3) 'Compensation' means the payments and 
benefits provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-102(3) (2005). 
2. The "Occupational disease aggravated by other diseases" provision is set forth 
verbatim in the Addendum to this brief. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 (2005). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. 
This is a petition, on writ of certiorari, to review the decision and opinion of the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Dale T. Smith & Sons v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT App 
1 
306 \ which affirmed the Order Affirming ALJ's Decision (hereinafter "Decision") of the 
Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission dated November 30, 2006 (R.68-70), and 
which likewise affirmed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (hereinafter 
"Order") of the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") dated September 6, 2006 
(R.53-57). 
b. Course of Proceedings. 
On August 11, 2005, Jeffrey D. Smith (hereinafter "claimant") filed an 
Application for Hearing alternatively claiming industrial accident or occupational disease 
for a lower back condition he claims arose from working "as a meat packer for many 
years [causing] cumulative injury to [his] lower back from excessive bending and lifting 
of heavy meat." (R.l). Petitioners herein, Dale T. Smith & Sons, Inc. and Workers 
Compensation Fund (hereinafter, collectively, "WCF") answered the Application by 
generally denying that claimant's "low back condition was caused by any work-related 
accident or exposures." (R. 16). 
After discovery, the case proceeded to hearing on July 7, 2006. The parties 
stipulated that the matter should be heard on a theory of occupational disease, not 
industrial accident. (R. 68 n.l). Also, claimant withdrew his claims for temporary total 
1
 This opinion was not published; however a companion case, Ameritech Library Services 
v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT App 305, 169 P.3d 784, which adjudicated the same 
issue, was published and relied upon by the court of appeals in this case. Likewise, this 
court has granted certiorari in Ameritech. 
2
 Claimant also joined Liberty Insurance Corp., an earlier workers compensation 
insurance carrier for Dale T. Smith & Sons, as a respondent. At the hearing, based upon 
stipulation of the parties, Liberty Insurance Corp. was dismissed as a party. (R. 53, 56). 
2 
disability compensation and permanent partial impairment compensation because those 
issues were resolved by stipulation of the parties prior to the hearing. (R. 54). 
On September 6, 2006, the ALJ entered the Order, which determined, inter alia, 
that because the claim was only for medical expenses and because even WCF's medical 
evidence showed that at least thirty-five percent (35%) of claimant's condition was 
attributable to occupational exposures, WCF was liable for payment of all medical 
expenses because such benefits are not "compensation" under the meaning of Section 
34A-3-110 allowing for apportionment of "compensation" against non-employment 
causes of claimant's condition. In making this determination, the ALJ relied upon the 
recent Labor Commission Appeals Board Order on Motion for Review in Edmonds v. 
Epixtech, Case No. 02-0969 (Appeals Board, August 29, 2006).4 (R. 55-56). 
On .October 5, 2006, WCF filed a Motion for Review before the Labor 
Commissioner, contending that although the ALJ properly applied the holding of 
Edmonds, Edmonds was wrongly decided and should be overruled.5 (R. 59-61). On 
WCF now admits that it is solely liable for claimant's occupational disease, subject to 
apportionment for non-employment causes of claimant's low back condition. 
Claimant never lost any work because of his condition so no temporary total disability 
was owed. Based upon the independent medical examination report and addendum from 
Dr. Stephen Marble, WCF admitted liability for permanent partial impairment 
compensation for seven percent (7%) of the whole person. 
The Edmonds case is the case now styled Ameritech Library Services v. Labor 
Commission, 2007 UT App 305, 169 P.3d 784, now also before this court on certiorari. 
WCF also argued that, because the apportionment was in dispute, that issue should have 
been referred to a medical panel under both statutory and administrative provisions. Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-601 (2005); Utah Admin. Code § R602-2-2(A)(l) (2007). Since the 
Appeals Board rejected WCF's suggestion that the Labor Commission overrule 
Edmonds, it did not reach this issue. If WCF prevails herein, then, on remand, the 
3 
November 30, 2006, the Labor Commission Appeals Board rejected WCPs contention 
that Edmonds was wrongly decided and entered the Decision, consisting of two pages. 
(R. 68-69). 
c. Disposition at Utah Court of Appeals. 
As already stated, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision, holding that, 
as it determined in Ameritech Library Services v. Labor Commission 2007 UT App 305, 
169 P.3d 784, "compensation" does not include payment for medical expenses, thereby 
subject to apportionment under Section 34A-3-110 of the Utah Code. Dale T. Smith & 
Sons v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT App 306, unnumbered f 2. 
d. Statement of Facts. 
Claimant was employed at Petitioner Dale T. Smith and Sons at an early age in 
1978. Dale T. Smith is claimant's grandfather, who founded the company as a family 
business. Claimant worked initially cleaning corrals and the plant and then, at age 16 
(1982), started working part time as a meat cutter. After college, claimant began working 
full time as a meat cutter. This job required heavy lifting, bending, pushing and pulling 
of cattle quarters and more. (R. 54). 
In 1995, claimant began experiencing low back pain and sought treatment with a 
chiropractor. Claimant periodically obtained chiropractic treatments and other 
conservative care for his low back pain over the years. Then, in 2003, claimant saw Dr. 
Gordon Kimball, M.D., who ultimately referred claimant for an MRI, which disclosed an 
Appeals Board will still need to consider whether the matter should be referred to a 
medical panel. 
4 
L5-S1 disk extrusion and lumbar degenerative changes, all of which Dr. Kimball 
attributed to claimant's work activities at Dale T. Smith & Sons. (R. 54, 74 [p. 12]). 
During discovery, WCF obtained an independent medical examination from Dr. 
Stephen Marble, M.D. In a report dated April 26, 2006, and an addendum thereto dated 
May 30, 2006, Dr. Marble agreed that most of claimant's L5-S1 injury and some of 
Smith's lumbar degenerative disease were attributable to claimant's work activities at 
Dale T. Smith and sons. In general, Dr. Marble concluded that 35% of claimant's entire 
low back condition was related to claimant's work activities and 65% to non-employment 
causes and conditions. (R. 54-55, 74 [pp. 1-B to 1-C, 8-9]). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals did not properly interpret Section 34A-3-110 of the Utah 
Code to conclude that payment of medical expenses are not "compensation" subject to 
apportionment,, especially when considering the plain language of the definition of 
"compensation" under Section 34A-2-102(3). Moreover, in Ameritech, which it applied 
here, the court of appeals improperly relied upon the rule of statutory construction 
announced in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 
1979) and Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982) because the 
factual framework in neither Kennecott nor Christensen exists here. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY 
CONCLUDED THAT PAYMENT OF MEDICAL 
EXPENSES IS NOT "COMPENSATION" SUBJECT TO 
APPORTIONMENT UNDER SECTION 34A-3-110 OF 
THE UTAH CODE 
In Ameritech, the court of appeals held that "because the [Workers Compensation 
Act] excludes payment of medical expenses from the definition of compensation, the 
term compensation as used in the [Utah Occupational Disease Act] also excludes medical 
expenses." Ameritech Library Services v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT App 305, f 16, 
169 P.3d 784, 789. The court of appeals mistakenly relied upon this court's decisions in 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979) and 
Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982) in support of its holding 
that "compensation", as interpreted in those cases under the Workers Compensation Act, 
does not include payment of medical expenses. In Kennecott and Christensen this court 
adopted a more narrow interpretation of "compensation" so that it would fulfill the intent 
of the statutes of limitations considered in those cases; however, there was no such 
justification here. Based upon rules of statutory construction and Taylor v. Industrial 
Commission, 1A2> P.2d 1183 (Utah 1987), the court of appeals should have adopted the 
more general definition of "compensation" set forth in Section 34A-2-102(3). 
Section 34A-3-110 provides that "[t]he compensation payable under this chapter 
shall be reduced and limited" by causes outside employment in the State of Utah. Utah 
6 
Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 (2005) (emphasis added). Thus, the key question is whether 
payment of medical expenses is "compensation" within the meaning of Section 34A-3-
110. 
In order to determine if the court of appeals correctly interpreted the term 
"compensation" this court has held that it must first look to the plain language of the 
statute. See, e.g., Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, \ 46, 164 P.3d 384, 
396; Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12, K 9, 84 P.3d 1201, 1205 
(workers compensation matters); see also, Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 2004 UT 102, % 
18, 104 P.3d 1242 (general). 
Although "compensation" is certainly defined in the dictionary, it is obviously a 
term of art used throughout Title 34A, the Utah Labor Code. "Compensation" is not 
defined in Section 34A-3-110, but has been defined in general definitions of the Utah 
Labor Code as follows: "'Compensation' means the payments and benefits provided for 
in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
102(3) (2005). Since payment of medical expenses is a "payment" and/or "benefit" 
under the Occupational Disease Act {see Id., §§ 34A-2-418; 34A-3-102(2); 34A-3-
107(2)), it then should follow that under the plain language of Section 34A-2-102(3), 
medical expenses are "compensation" subject to apportionment under Section 34A-
3-110. 
Even assuming that it is not plain that the general definition of "compensation" 
applies to Section 34A-3-110, this court has also held that "[sjtatutes should be read as a 
whole and their provisions interpreted in harmony with related provisions and statutes." 
7 
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, If 46, 164 P.3d 384,396; Miller v. 
tffeaver, 2003 UT 12, ^  17, 66 P.3d 592. 
Under another section of the Occupational Disease Act itself, the legislature 
explicitly provides that in cases of occupational disease, an employer is liable to pay both 
medical and disability (indemnity) benefits and then in following subsection of the very 
same section, states that "compensation shall not be paid when the last day of injurious 
exposure of the employee to the hazards of the occupational disease occurred prior to 
1941." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-104 (2005) (emphasis added). Surely the legislature 
intended this "statute of repose" also to include both types of benefits together as 
"compensation?" 
Likewise, under Section 34A-3-111 of the Occupational Disease Act, the 
legislature explicitly provides that "compensation under this chapter is not in addition to 
compensation that may be payable under [the Workers Compensation Act] . . . ." Id., § 
34A-3-111 (emphasis added). Surely, the legislature did not intend that an injured 
worker could not recover indemnity benefits for the same injury (medical condition) 
under both the Workers Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act, yet could 
recover medical expenses under both acts? 
The court of appeals takes a more narrow approach by contending that Section 
34A-3-110, by its terms, is limited to cases of occupational disease resulting in disability 
or death only. Therefore, the court of appeals reasons, the legislature did not intend 
"compensation" in that section to include payment of medical expenses. Ameritech 
8 
Library Services v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT App 306, U 14, 169 P.3d at 788.6 But, 
under the Occupational Disease Act, a cause of action for occupational disease arguably 
does not even arise until the employee has suffered disability. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-
108(2)(b) (2005). Moreover, Section 34A-3-107 provides that u[t]he disabled employee 
is entitled to medical, hospital and burial expenses . . . ," Id., § 34A-3-107(2) (emphasis 
added), which implies that the employee must be disabled before he is entitled to any 
benefits under the Occupational Disease Act. Of course, if, within the meaning of 
Sections 34A-3-107 and -108, disability has a more general meaning of loss of bodily 
function, as opposed to disability from employment, then that meaning makes more sense 
in the context of the Occupational Disease Act as a whole, including Section 34A-3-110. 
Otherwise, an employee could suffer an occupational disease for which he seeks payment 
of medical expenses only, but not have a cause of action to recover such benefits because 
he has not yet lost work as a result. It is doubtful that this is what the legislature 
intended. 
As stated above, the court of appeals supports its deviation from the plain language 
of Section 34A-2-102(3) by relying upon Kennecott and Christensen to show that this 
6
 The court of appeals partly bases this contention on the fact that Section 34A-3-105 of 
the Occupational Disease Act does specifically include medical expenses in the 
apportionment formula when the apportionment of harmful exposures at other employers 
is at issue. Id. Interestingly, claimant has previously argued that one reason medical 
expenses should not be apportioned in the current context is that it would be difficult to 
administer when the claim is for medical expenses only. Yet, it would be just as difficult, 
if not more so in the case of multiple employers, when Section 34A-3-105 likewise 
applies to a claim for medical expenses only. 
9 
court has already interpreted "compensation" to not include payment of medical 
expenses. 
In both Kennecott and Christensen, this court interpreted "compensation" within 
the more narrow meaning of that term in the then statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-99 (1953 codification). This court did not consider the more general meaning of 
"compensation" under Section 34A-2-102(3).7 Had this court adopted the more general 
definition of "compensation" under the then version of Section 34A-2-102(3), it would 
have rendered the statute of limitations regarding indemnity benefits meaningless. In that 
regard, this court stated as follows: 
[I]f the furnishing of or payment for medical expenses by the company, 
which may continue indefinitely, were to extend the limitation in which a 
claim may be filed until three years after the last payment of such 
medical expense, that would completely nullify any effect to be given to 
Sec. 35-1-99, and thus defeat the legislative intent and the purpose of 
that statute. That would be contrary to a cardinal rule of statutory 
construction: that, if there is uncertainty of doubt as to the meaning of 
statutes, they should be so interpreted and implied as to give meaning in 
effect to both. 
Kennecott Copper Corp., v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875, 877-78 (Utah 1979) 
(citing, 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 253). 
In Christensen, this court held the same on converse facts: that "compensation" 
cannot be interpreted to limit the statute of limitations for payment of medical expenses 
7
 Although Section 34A-2-102(3) was numbered differently as Section § 35-1-44(6) in 
the Workers Compensation Act and Section 35-2-12(b) in the Occupational Disease Act 
when Kennecott and Christensen were decided in 1979 and 1982, the basic definition has 
not changed. 
10 
to the same period as for indemnity benefits. Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 
P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 1982). 
In the instant case, since no conflict is created by applying the more general 
definition of "compensation" under Section 34A-2-102(3), the court of appeals and Labor 
Commission need not have reverted to the rule of statutory construction stated in 
Kennecott to resolve a conflict between statutes. 
The narrow applicability of Kennecott and Christensen is further illustrated in 
another Utah Supreme Court case that determined that "compensation" does include 
medical expenses. In Taylor v. Industrial Commission, 1A2> P.2d 1183 (Utah 1987), a 
claimant sought a determination that payment of medical expenses were not 
"compensation" to which a claim for reimbursement and offset against recovery in a 
s 
Third Party action would be applied under the then version of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
106 (2005).8 This court upheld the ALJ and Labor Commission's holding that within the 
meaning of the then version of Section 34A-2-106, "compensation" did include payment 
of medical expenses. Id., at 1185-86 (citing 2A A. Larsen, Workers' Compensation Law 
§ 74.33). Although Taylor did not directly consider the interpretation of "compensation" 
found in Kennecott, it is obvious that the supreme court can and does apply differing 
interpretations depending upon the context of the statute. Here, as already stated, the 
context of the statute requires the more general definition of compensation under Section 
34A-2-102(3). 
The then version was Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (Supp. 1987). 
l l 
It is also interesting to note that Taylor was decided after both Kennecott and 
Christensen. The court of appeals reasoned that since the legislature had left the 
definition of "compensation", now under Section 34A-2-102(3), unchanged since 
Kennecott and Christensen were decided, "'the legislature is presumed to have been 
satisfied with the prior judicial constructions of the unchanged portions of the statute and 
to have adopted them as consistent with its own intent."' Ameritech Library Services v. 
Labor Commission, 2007 UT App 305, \ 12, 169 P.3d 784, 787 (quoting Christensen, 
642 P.2d at 756). Of course, WCF urges that this court does adopt this reasoning of the 
court of appeals; that is, if the legislature had not changed the general definition of 
"compensation" since Taylor was decided, then it must have intended the interpretation 
there to apply to future cases, including the instant case.9 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above discussion, this court should reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals and remand the case for further .proceedings before the Appeals Board and, 
ultimately, the ALJ. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this ^27^ day of February, 2008. 
Floyd W Holm, Attorney for Petitioners 
9
 In fairness to the court of appeals, it should be noted that Taylor was not mentioned in 
the briefing in Ameritech; however, it was thoroughly discussed in the briefing before the 
court of appeals in this case. Also, this argument is somewhat "tongue in cheek". WCF 
still maintains its fundamental argument that "compensation" can mean different things 
in different contexts. 
12 
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ADDENDUM 
15 
Text of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 (2005) 
A 
§ 34A-3-110. Occupational disease aggravated by other diseases 
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited to the 
proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease 
were the sole cause of disability or death, as the occupational disease as a causative 
factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the occupational disease, 
or any part of the disease: 
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not subject to 
commission jurisdiction; 
(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure 
outside of employment or to which the general public is commonly exposed; 
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; or 
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is 
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an occupational 
disease. 
l 
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OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
McHUGH, Judge: 
Dale T. Smith & Sons and the Workers' Compensation Fund (collectively Petitioners) seek review of the Utah 
Labor Commission's order requiring that they pay 100% of Jeffrey D. Smith's medical expenses related to treatment 
of his lumbar degenerative joint disease. Petitioners argue that the Labor Commission incorrectly interpreted Utah 
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Affirmed. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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OPINION BY: Carolyn B. McHugh 
OPINION 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
[**784] McHUGH, Judge: 
[*P1] Ameritech Library Services and American 
Manufacturing Mutual/Kemper (collectively Ameritech) 
petition for review of the Utah Labor Commission's (the 
Commission) order requiring that they pay 100% of 
Tamara Edmonds's medical expenses related to treatment 
of her carpal tunnel syndrome. Ameritech argues that the 
Appeals Board of the Commission (the Appeals Board) 
erred when it failed to properly apply Utah Code section 
34A-3-110, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-JI0 (2005), to 
apportion medical expenses based on the causal 
contribution of industrial factors to Edmonds's 
occupational disease. We affirm. 
[**785] BACKGROUND 
[*P2] Ameritech Library Services employed 
Edmonds as a project coordinator and administrative 
assistant from 1991 until 1999. Edmonds's duties 
included scheduling and completing purchase orders for 
all equipment, entering data, installing hardware, and 
performing [***2] other miscellaneous tasks necessary 
to complete projects. ' In 1992, Edmonds first noticed 
intermittent pain in her wrists. The pain became constant 
in the fall of 1993, and Edmonds sought medical 
treatment in January 1994. Treatment for her pain 
continued over the course of the next several years. She 
terminated her employment in 1999. By that time, her 
symptoms included bilateral pain and numbness in the 
fingers, hands, wrists, arms, shoulders, neck, and head. 
Despite Edmonds ending her employment with 
Ameritech, the pain continued. 
1 Eventually, Edmonds accepted a position as 
an inside sales representative. However, most of 
her duties remained the same, requiring constant 
desk and telephone work. 
[*P3] In September 2002, Edmonds filed an 
Application for Hearing with the Commission seeking 
further coverage for carpal tunnel syndrome, which she 
attributed to the repetitive trauma to her hands and arms 
from excessive keyboard use and other job activities with 
Ameritech. The Commission appointed a medical panel 
to evaluate the conflicting medical aspects of Edmonds's 
claim. The panel opined that Edmonds's work activities 
acted as a 10% aggravation of the 90% non-industrial 
risk factors that [***3] caused her carpal tunnel 
syndrome. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
concluded that "10% of the cause of [Edmonds's] carpal 
tunnel symptoms is related to her work exposure 
throughout her period of employment with [Ameritech]." 
[*P4] Edmonds filed a motion for review with the 
Appeals Board arguing that the ALJ erred in 
apportioning medical expenses pursuant to section 34 A-
3-110, see id., which resulted in the determination that 
Ameritech was liable for only 10% of Edmonds's 
medical expenses. The Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ's 
finding that Edmonds's carpal tunnel syndrome had a 
10% causal connection to industrial factors, but reversed 
the ALJ's determination that Ameritech was liable for 
only 10% of Edmonds's medical expenses. Instead, the 
Appeals Board concluded that apportionment under 
1 
section 34A-3-110, see id., was not applicable to medical 
expenses and that Ameritech, therefore, was liable for 
100% of those expenses. Ameritech seeks review of the 
Appeals Board's decision. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P5] Ameritech argues that the Appeals Board 
incorrectly interpreted "compensation" as used in Utah 
Code section 34A-3-110, see id., when it concluded that 
medical expenses were not included [***4] in the term 
and were therefore not apportionable under the statute. 
M[A]n agency's interpretation or application of statutory 
terms should be reviewed under the correction-of-error 
standard." Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT66,P14, 
7 P.3d 777\ see also Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 2006 UT 
App 179,P13, 136 P.3d 1273 ("We review the [Labor] 
Commission's interpretations of law under a correction-
of-error standard."). "Additionally, if the legislative 
intent concerning the specific question at issue can be 
derived through traditional methods of statutory 
construction, the agency's interpretation will be granted 
no deference and the statute will be interpreted in accord 
with its legislative intent." Esquivel, 2000 UT 66 at PI4, 
7 P.3d 777 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
[*P6] Ameritech argues that the Appeals Board 
erred when it determined that apportionment of 
Edmonds's medical expenses was not appropriate under 
section 34A-3-110 of the Utah Occupational Disease Act 
(UODA), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-3-101 to -J 12 
(2005 & Supp. 2007). Section 34A-3-110 states in 
relevant part: 
The compensation payable under this 
chapter shall be reduced and limited to the 
proportion of the compensation that 
would [***5] be payable if the 
occupational disease were the sole cause 
of disability or death, as the occupational 
disease as a causative factor bears to all 
the causes of the disability or [**786] 
death when the occupational disease, or 
any part of the disease: 
(3) is aggravated by any other disease 
or infirmity not itself compensable; or 
(4) when disability or death from any 
other cause not itself compensable is 
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in 
any way contributed to by an occupational 
disease. 
Id. §34A-3-l 10 (2005). 
[*P7] Thus, the narrow question presented by this 
case is whether the term compensation under section 
34A-3-110 of the UODA, see id., includes payments for 
medical expenses. If it does, then Edmonds's claim for 
future medical expenses should be apportioned, requiring 
Ameritech to pay only that share of the medical expenses 
attributable to the industrial cause of Edmonds's disease-
here, 10%. If compensation does not include payments 
for medical expenses, then apportionment under section 
34A-3-110 is inapplicable and Edmonds is entitled to 
recover all medical expenses incurred in the treatment of 
her disease regardless of the percentage attributable to an 
industrial cause. 
[*P8] In support [***6] of its contention that the 
term compensation, as used in section 34A-3-110, 
includes payments for medical expenses, Ameritech 
relies on section 34A-2-102(3) of the Workers' 
Compensation Act (WCA), see id. §§ 34A-2-101 to -905 
(2005 & Supp. 2007), which defines "[compensation" to 
"mean[] the payments and benefits provided for in this 
chapter[, WCA,] or Chapter 3, [UODA]," id § 34A-2-
102(3) (2005). Ameritech reasons that medical expenses 
are both a payment and a benefit for Edmonds's 
industrial disease. 
[*P9] Between 1979 and 1982, however, the Utah 
Supreme Court twice addressed whether the term 
compensation as used in the WCA included payments for 
medical expenses. In the first case, Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 
1979), the court held that, under the WCA, the term 
compensation did not include payments for medical or 
hospital expenses. See id. at 877 ("[T]here is a distinct 
difference between 'compensation' which is paid for an 
injury in lieu of wages which otherwise would have been 
earned, and the adjunctive award of medical and hospital 
expenses for treating the injury."). The supreme court 
reached this conclusion without specifically referencing 
the [***7] definition of compensation in the WCA, but 
instead relied upon two provisions of the WCA, Utah 
Code sections 35-1-45 2 and 35-1-81. 3 See id. The 
Kennecott court determined that these two sections 
"treat[ed] medicals as something different from the 
compensation in lieu of wages, and that it therefore" 
followed that medical expenses are not compensation 
within the meaning of the WCA. Id. 
2 Section 35-1-45 stated in relevant part: 
Every employee . . . who is 
injured . . . by accident arising out 
of or in the course of his 
employment . . . shall be paid, 
such compensation for loss 
2 
sustained on account of such 
injury or death, and such amount 
for medical, nurse and hospital 
services and medicines, and, in 
case of death, such amount of 
funeral expenses, as is herein 
provided. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1974) (current 
version at id. § 34A-2-401 (2005)). 
3 Section 35-1-81 provided in relevant part: 
In addition to the compensation 
provided for in this title the 
employer or the insurance carrier 
shall also be required to pay such 
reasonable sum for medical, nurse 
and hospital services, and for 
medicines . . . as may be necessary 
to treat the patient . . . . 
Id. § 35-1-81 (Supp. 1979) (current version 
[***8] at id § 34A-2-418 (2005)). 
[*P10] In 1982, the supreme court again considered 
the question of whether compensation, as defined by the 
WCA, included medical expenses. In Christensen v. 
Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982), the 
petitioners made an argument identical to that asserted 
here by Ameritech. Relying on a prior version of section 
34A-2-102(3), which defined compensation to "mean the 
payments and benefits provided for in this title," Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-44(6) (1974) (current version at id. § 
34A-2-102(3) (2005)), 4 the petitioners argued that 
medical [**787] expenses were both a payment and a 
benefit under the WCA. See Christensen, 642 P.2d at 
756. 
4 At the time the Utah Supreme Court decided 
Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 
755 (Utah 1982), the definition of compensation 
for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act 
was found in section 35-1-44(6). See Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-44(6) (1974) (amended and 
renumbered at id. § 34A-2-102(3) (2005)). Since 
that time, the legislature has amended and 
renumbered the section several times. See, e.g., 
Act of Feb. 7, 1991, ch. 136, sec. 3, § 35-1-44, 
1991 Utah Laws 496, 497 (amending some 
defined terms, adding new terms, and 
renumbering); [***9] Act of Feb. 27, 1996, ch. 
240, sec. 106, § 35A-3-102, 1996 Utah Laws 893, 
938 (renumbering section 35-1-44 as 35A-3-102); 
Act of Mar. 4, 1997, ch. 375, sec. 84, § 34A-2-
102, 1997 Utah Laws 1438, 1474 (renumbering 
section 35A-3-J02 as 34A-2-102 and amending to 
add reference to the Utah Occupational Disease 
Act in definition of compensation). 
[*P11] The Christensen court disagreed. 
Reaffirming Kennecott, the supreme court held that 
despite the broad definition of compensation in the 
WCA, the term did not include medical expenses. See id. 
at 757. The court reasoned that because it had previously 
determined that medical expenses were outside the 
definition of compensation, and because the Utah 
Legislature had not amended or changed the two sections 
of the Utah Code relied upon for that decision-sections 
35-1-45 and 35-1-81--that the legislature must have 
ratified, as consistent with its own intent, the definition 
of compensation announced in Kennecott. See id. at 756-
57. 
[*P12] Since the Utah Supreme Court decided 
Kennecott and Christensen, the Utah Legislature has left 
the statutes relied upon for those decisions largely 
unchanged. Although section 35-1-45 has been 
renumbered twice and subdivided [***10] once since 
Kennecott, 5 it remains substantively similar to the 
previous version. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 
(2005), 6 with id. § 35-1-45 (1974) (amended and 
renumbered). Furthermore, the legislature has left intact 
over the last twenty-five years the language of section 
35-1-81 relied upon by the Kennecott court. See id. § 35-
1-81 (Supp. 1979) (amended and renumbered); 
Kennecott, 597 P.2d at 877. Indeed, it has done so while 
amending other portions of section 35-1-81 to 
specifically refer to the UODA. See Act of Mar. 4, 1997, 
ch. 375, sec. 126, § 34A-2-418, 1997 Utah Laws 1438, 
1498 (renumbering section 35A-3-418 as 34A-2-418 and 
amending to add a reference to UODA). In its current 
form the section states: 
(1) In addition to the compensation 
provided in this chapter or Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act, the 
employer or the insurance carrier shall 
pay reasonable sums for medical, nurse, 
and hospital services, for medicines, and 
for artificial means, appliances, and 
prostheses necessary to treat the injured 
employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418 (2005) (emphasis added). 
This amendment is particularly instructive because, as 
the Kennecott court noted, the use of the phrase [***! 1] 
"
y[i]n addition to the compensation provided for'" 
indicates that the legislature intended to "treat[] medicals 
3 
as something different from the compensation in lieu of 
wages." 597 P.2d at 877 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 35-
1-81 (Supp. 1979) (amended and renumbered)). 
Moreover, because the legislature chose to insert a 
reference to the UODA in section 34A-2-418 without 
otherwise changing the substantive language, we must 
assume that, like the WCA, medical expenses are 
something in addition to or otherwise separate from 
compensation for purposes of the UODA. See 
Christensen, 642 P.2d at 756 ("A well-established canon 
of statutory construction provides that where a legislature 
amends a portion of a statute but leaves other portions 
unamended, or re-enacts them without change, the 
legislature is presumed to have been satisfied with prior 
judicial constructions of the unchanged portions of the 
statute and to have adopted them as consistent with 
[**788] its own intent."); see also Brown & Root Indus. 
Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671, 674 (Utah 
1997) (noting that compensation has been construed "to 
exclude medical expenses" within the meaning of WCA 
(citing Kennecott, 597 P.2d 875)); United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 657 P.2d 764, 766 
(Utah 1983) [***12] (noting that Kennecott "draws a 
distinction between compensation which is paid for an 
injury and medical and hospital expenses which are paid 
for treatment of the injury"); Christensen, 642 P.2d at 
756-57; Kennecott, 597P.2d at 877-78. 
5 See Act of Feb. 27, 1996, ch. 240, sec. 144, § 
35A-3-401, 1996 Utah Laws 893, 952 
(renumbering section 35-1-45 as 35A-3-401); Act 
of Mar. 4, 1997, ch. 375, sec. 109, § 34A-2-401, 
1997 Utah Laws 1438, 1488 (renumbering 
section 35A-3-40I as 34A-2-401); Workers 
Compensation Coverage Amendments, ch. 55, 
sec. 6, § 34A-2-40J, 1999 Utah Laws 215, 222 
(dividing section 34A-2-40I into subsections). 
6 The current version provides: 
(1) An employee . . . who is 
injured . . . by accident arising out 
of and in the course of the 
employee's employment, . . . shall 
be paid: 
(a) compensation 
for loss sustained 
on account of the 
injury or death; 
(b) the amount 
provided in this 
chapter for: 
(i) medical, 
nurse, and hospital 
services; 
(ii) medicines; 
and 
(iii) in case of 
death, the amount 
of funeral expenses. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2005). 
[*P13] Ameritech argues that the Kennecott and 
Christensen decisions are limited to their facts and only 
govern the resolution of issues related [***13] to the 
applicable statute of limitations. In support of its 
position, Ameritech notes the express provision allowing 
for the apportionment of medical expenses in the case of 
occupational disease. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-
105(2) ("[Liability for disability, death, and medical 
benefits shall be apportioned between employers based 
on the involved employers' causal contribution to the 
occupational disease."). According to Ameritech, the fact 
that apportionment was expressly added to section 34A-
3-105 after the decisions in Kennecott and Christensen 
indicates the legislature's intent to supersede the analysis 
in those cases. In addition, Ameritech argues that it 
would make no sense for the legislature to allow 
apportionment of medical expenses in the context of an 
occupational disease under section 34A-3-105, see id. § 
34A-3-105, but not under section 34A-3-U0, see id. § 
34A-3-110. Consequently, Ameritech contends that the 
use of the term compensation in section 34A-3-110, see 
id., must have included medical expenses as well as 
payments made in lieu of wages. We are not persuaded 
by this argument. 
[*P14] First, section 34A-3-110 is limited to 
situations in which the occupational disease causes 
[***14] "disability or death." Id. ("The compensation 
payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited 
to the proportion of the compensation that would be 
payable if the occupational disease were the sole cause of 
disability or death . . . ."). Here, Edmonds has not died 
and the Commission expressly found that "Ms. Edmonds 
has not shown that her carpal tunnel syndrome caused 
any disability, but she has required medical care." 
Second, the inclusion of apportionment language in 
section 34A-3-105 evidences the legislature's 
understanding of how to make allocation available. 
Consequently, the omission of such language in section 
34A-3-110 indicates that the legislature did not intend to 
allow apportionment under that section. See, e.g., State 
4 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1187 
(Utah 1996) (concluding that where provisions in one 
section show that the legislature knew how to make its 
intent clear, absence of similar language in a different 
section indicates contrary intent); State v. Hobbs, 2003 
UT App 27,P2l, 64 P.3d 1218 (same); In re A.B., 936 
P.2d 1091, 1098 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (same). Third, to 
the extent that the legislature is unclear, we must 
interpret the UODA [***15] liberally in favor of the 
claimant to implement its remedial purpose. See, e.g., 
State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 105J, 
1053 (Utah 1984) ("The [WCA] should be liberally 
construed and applied to provide coverage."); Luckau v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 840 P.2d 811, 815 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) ("[A]ny doubts [about the interpretation of the 
UODA] should be resolved in favor of the applicant."). 
Resolving any doubts in favor of Edmonds, we conclude 
that the Appeals Board was correct in disallowing 
apportionment of medical expenses under section 34A-3-
110. 
[*P15] Ameritech's final argument is that, from a 
public policy standpoint, it makes no sense to require an 
employer to pay 100% of the medical expenses for the 
treatment of a disease that has only a 10% contribution 
from industrial causes. While this argument may be 
appropriately made to the legislature, we simply cannot 
substitute our judgment for its in matters of public 
policy. Cf. Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., 2004 UT 
57,P30, 96 P.3d 903 (noting that allocation of recovery 
under the WCA "is a matter for legislative, rather than 
judicial, determination"). Had the legislature intended to 
require apportionment of medical expenses [***16] 
based on the employer's causal contribution [**789] to 
the occupational disease it would have done so. Cf., e.g., 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-105 (requiring that medical 
expenses be apportioned between two or more employers 
relative to their causal contribution to the occupational 
disease under the WCA).7 
7 Counsel for Edmonds noted, during oral 
argument, that there may be persuasive policy 
reasons for eliminating any dispute about medical 
expenses so that applicants can be treated 
immediately, without any confusion as to whether 
medical providers will be compensated. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P16] The UODA uses the same definition of 
compensation as the WCA. Consequently, because the 
WCA excludes medical expenses from the definition of 
compensation, the term compensation as used in the 
UODA also excludes medical expenses. Therefore, the 
Appeals Board of the Commission properly concluded 
that apportionment under Utah Code section 34A-3-110 
of the Utah Occupational Disease Act was not applicable 
to Edmonds's medical expenses for carpal tunnel 
syndrome. 
[*P17] Affirmed. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
[*P18] WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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Order Affirming ALJ's Decision, 
(Appeals Board, November 30, 2006) 
APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
JEFFREY D. SMITH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DALE T. SMITH & SONS and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
Respondents. 
ORDER AFFIRMING 
ALPS DECISION 
Case No. 05-0707 
**C£JVEo 
Worker ~ 
Dale T. Smith & Sons and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund (referred to 
jointly as "Smith & Sons" hereafter), request review of Administrative Law Judge Hann's decision 
awarding medical benefits to Jeffrey D. Smith under the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; 
Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §63-46b-12, §34A-2-801(3) and §34A-3-102. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Jeffrey Smith seeks payment of medical expenses necessary to treat his degenerative low 
back condition.1 Smith & Sons contends that Mr. Smith's low back condition should be 
apportioned between work and non-work causes and that Smith & Son's liabihty for medical 
expenses should be limited accordingly. 
In her decision of September 6, 2006, Judge Harm denied Smith & Sons' request for 
apportionment of Mr. Smith's medical expenses. In doing so, she relied on the Appeals Board's 
decision in Tamara Edmonds v. Epixtech, et al. (Labor Commission Case No. 02-0969; issued 
August 29, 2006), which held that medical expenses are nor subject to the apportionment provisions 
of §34A-3-l 10 of the Act. In seeking review of Judge Hann's decision, Smith & Sons argues that 
Edmonds was wrongly decided 
l Irfrfiiny7"Mr~SmiTir"original 1 y~file d~alfernafive claims "tor medicafTJenefitsf"arid""disabilTty" 
compensation under both the Utah Occupational Disease Act and the Utah Workers1 Compensation 
Act Mr Smith also named Liberty Insurance Corp as a respondent. Liberty was later dismissed 
from these proceedings and the remaining parties resolved Mr. Smith's claim for disability 
compensation Consequently, the only remaining issue is Mr Smith's right to payment of medical 
expenses With the apparent consent of the parties, fudge Hann adjudicated that issue under the 
provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
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DISCUSSION 
In Edmonds the Appeals Board concluded that §34 A-3-110's use of the term "compensation" 
for purposes of apportionment must be understood in light of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979), which held that 
compensation did not include medical benefits. The Appeals Board further concluded that this 
interpretation was supported by the principle that the Act must be liberally construed and the 
impossibility of ap)plying §34A-3-l 10's apportionment provision to medical-only claims. 
Having visited this issue once again, the Appeals Board believes the reasoning followed in 
Edmonds is correct. Under that reasoning, Mr. Smith's medical expenses are not subject to 
apportionment under §34A-3-l 10. 
ORDER 
The Appeals Board affirms Judge Hann's decision. It is so ordered. 
Dated this 30 day of November, 2006. 
Colleen S. Colton, Chair 
Patricia S. Drawe 
Josej^E. Hatch 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the I Itah Court of Appeals 
•by^liftjE^^etrtiorrfor^ petition foi icviewnmrastijCTeceivgd~bTth(r" 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the matter of Jeffrey 
D. Smith, Case No. 05-0707, was mailed first class postage prepaid this 3C) day of November, 
2006, to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Smith 
655E12500S 
Draper UT 84020 
Dale T. Smith & Sons 
12450 Pony Express 
Draper UT 84020 
Liberty Insurance Corp 
175 Berkeley St 
Boston MA 02117 
Floyd Holm, Esq. 
Workers Compensation Fund 
392 E 6400 S 
Salt Lake City UT 84107 
Phillip Shell, Esq. 
45 E Vine St 
Murray UT 84107 
Bret Gardner, Esq. 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
Dated September 6, 2006 
1^ UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
POBox 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
801-530-6800 
tot 
S&7 
O^ft 
t\/£0 
2QQ6J 
JEFFREY D SMITH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DALE T SiMITH AND SONS and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP, 
Respondent 
Varti »<W, 
^ent ^Kj 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No. 05-0707 
Judge Debbie L. Hann 
HEARING: Room 332 Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on July 7, 2006 at 8:30 AM. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Debbie L. Hann, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Jeffrey D Smith, was present and represented by his/her 
attorney Phillip Shell Esq. 
The respondents, Dale T Smith and Sons and Workers Compensation 
Fund, were represented by attorney Floyd Holm Esq. The respondents, 
Dale T Smith and Sons and Liberty Insurance Corp were represented by 
attorney Bret Gardner Esq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner's Application for Hearing alleges entitlement to medical expenses, recommended 
medical care, temporary total compensation and permanent partial compensation as the result of 
a cumulative trauma injury and an occupational disease to the petitioner's low back. The 
Commission issued a Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings & Order for Answer on August 
17, 2005. Both Answers denied the petitioner had suffered a compensable injury or occupational 
disease. 
Prior to the hearing, Liberty Insurance Corp, filed a motion to dismiss itself as a party to the 
proceedings. This motion was granted at the hearing based upon the stipulation of the parties. 
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Jeffrey D Smith vs. Dale T Smith And Sons and/or Workers Compensation Fund; Liberty 
Insurance Corp 
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At the hearing, the petitioner withdrew its claims for compensation as those issues had been 
resolved leaving the medical claim as outstanding. The only issue remaining as to medical 
expenses is the apportionment between industrial and non-industrial causes. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The petitioner is employed by the respondent a family business. He began at age 12 after school 
cleaning corrals and the plant. He began working part time as a meat cutter at age 16 and then 
began working full time as a meat cutler when he joined the business full time following college. 
Generally, this employment required the petitioner to regularly lift and manipulate quarters of 
beef weighing 100-200 pounds, haul live cattle, including "downer" cows that required the 
petitioner to prod, shock, push, pull, lift and twist to get these immobile cows into trailers The 
petitioner is now age 40 and suffers from lumbar degenerative joint disease. 
The petitioner sought treatment for low back pain in August 1995 and was diagnosed with 
"sciatic neuralgia'* by Dr. Egbert, a chiropractor. The petitioner sought treatment for low back 
pain off and on with chiropractors over the years. 
On September 22, 2003, the petitioner sought treatment with Dr. Kimball for, among other 
things, low back pain. He was assessed with a lumbar sprain and an MRI was recommended. 
Medical exhibit 15. The MRI was done on September 26, 2003 and revealed the L5-S1 disc 
extrusion and lumbar degenerative changes but the petitioner did not get the results of this report 
until February 2004. Medical exhibit 77-78, 14. 
The petitioner told his father and uncles, the owners of Dale T. Smith and Sons, about his back 
condition as the result of the heaving lifting at work. The petitioner reported back pain as the 
result of heavy lifting to his family members over the years of working. The petitioner 
characterized Dr. Kimball's report to him as having the back of "a 65 year old man" and when he 
realized he had more than a temporary back strain, he reported his condition to his father and 
uncles. The respondent, Dale T. Smith and Sons, filed a first report of injury in September 2004 
after the petitioner expressed concern that his claim might not be covered for lack of notice. 
The respondent, Dale T. Smith and Sons, received timely notice of the petitioner's claim. 
Whether a first report was timely prepared by the employer is not within the control of the 
employee who reported his industrial back condition, progressing from temporary strains to the 
current claim of lumbar degenerative disc disease. 
Dr. Kimball attributed the petitioner's L5-S1 ruptured disc and narrowing at L4-5 and L2-3 to 
"years of rigorous work ex: lifting, turning, pulling." MedicaJ exhibit 13. 
Dr. Marble opined that 75% of the petitioner's L5-S1 condition was caused by his work activities 
and that 25% of the other lumbar degenerative changes were caused by work activities. 
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Medical exhibit 9. In a subsequent addendum to his original report, Dr. Marble apportioned 35% 
of the petitioner's "entire overall low back condition'* to his work activities and 75% to non-
industrial conditions. Dr. Marble assigned a 7% whole person impairment for the petitioner's 
L5-S1 disk condition fully to the petitioner's work activities. Medical exibit 1-B. 
The petitioner's employment activities with the respondent, Dale T. Smith and Sons, caused in 
full or in part, the petitioner's degenerative lumbar disc disease. 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
A compensable occupational disease is "... any disease or illness that arises out of and in the 
course of employment and is medically caused or aggravated by that employment." Utah Code 
Ann. §34A-3-i03. 
Utah Code § 34A-3-108(2) outlines the petitioner's reporting obligation for an occupational 
disease: 
(2) (a) Any employee who fails to notify the employee's employer or the division 
within 180 days after the cause of action arises is barred from any claim of benefits 
arising from the occupational disease. 
(b) The cause of action is considered to arise on the date the employee first suffered 
disability from the occupational disease and knew, or in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have known, that the occupational disease was caused by employment. 
Utah Code § 34A-3-110 outlines when "compensation" should be 3pportioned to account for 
other non-compensable contributing causes. In Edmonds v. Epixtech et al.» Case No. 02-0969 
(issued 8/29/06)1, the Commission Appeals Board ruled that medical benefits are not 
compensation under § 34A-3-110 and therefore not subject to apportionment. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The petitioner suffered a compensable occupational disease, degenerative lumbar disc disease, 
while employed by the respondent, Dale T. Smiths and Sons. 
The respondent, Liberty Insurance Co., is dismissed as a party to this claim. 
This ease aopears lo overrule the holding in MilliRan v Utah Stale Tax Commission, Case, No. 00-0232 (issued 
4/30/02). 
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The respondents, Dale T. Smith and Sons and Workers Compensation Fund, are liable to the 
petitioner for reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the petitioner's low back condition 
pursuant to the Commission RBRVS fee schedule. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, Dale T. Smith and Sons and Workers 
Compensation Fund, pay the petitioner for reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the 
petitioner's low back condition pursuant to the Commission RBRVS fee schedule. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent, Liberty Insurance Co, is dismissed as a party 
to this claim. 
DATED September 6, 2006. /I 
Debbie L. Harm 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication Division 
of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basis for 
review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this decision is 
signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days 
of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the 
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on September 6, 2006, to the 
persons/parties at the following addresses: 
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Phillip Shell Esq 
45 E Vine St 
Murray UT 84107 
Bret Gardner Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Floyd Holm Esq 
392 E 6400 S 
P O Box 57929 
Salt Lake City UT 84107 
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Clerk, Adjudication Division 
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